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How final and irreversible is survivorship in the context of joint tenancies? Where an interest 
evaporates as a result of the death of a joint tenant, normally it will not be coming back in 
any shape or form, despite the clear intention of the deceased and even where those 
intentions are expressed in a will. Once survivorship has operated only statutory provisions 
will reverse its consequences. Where a will or the rules on intestacy have failed to provide a 
reasonable level of financial provision for a dependant, a potentially powerful statutory 
provision which may reverse the effects of survivorship for a person who claims to be a 
dependant of the deceased is s. 9 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) 
Act 1975. This section provides that: 
(1) Where a deceased person was immediately before his death beneficially entitled to a 
joint tenancy of any property, then, if [...] an application is made for an order under section 2 
of this Act, the court for the purpose of facilitating the making of financial provision for the 
applicant under this Act may order that the deceased's severable share of that property [...] 
shall, to such extent as appears to the court to be just in all the circumstances of the case, 
be treated for the purposes of this Act as part of the net estate of the deceased.  
(1A) Where an order is made under subsection (1) the value of the deceased's severable 
share of the property concerned is taken for the purposes of this Act to be the value that the 
share would have had at the date of the hearing of the application for an order under section 
2 had the share been severed immediately before the deceased's death, unless the court 
orders that the share is to be valued at a different date.1 
This provision is not, as was acknowledged early on, as clearly drafted as one would wish.2 
One notable problem is that the phrase “for the purpose of facilitating the making of financial 
provision” has to be construed widely because of the interrelationship of s.9 with s.3 which 
lays down the criteria which the court has to take account in deciding whether to make an 
order under the Act. There are two stages for the court to consider, first in deciding whether 
there has been reasonable provision provided by the deceased’s Will or by the law of 
intestacy and secondly, assuming that there has not been, what is the appropriate order to 
make to provide such reasonable provision. It has been decided, and now accepted as 
uncontroversial3, that the court has a discretion at the first stage in applying the criteria listed 
in s.3 of the Act as to whether to include the deceased’s severable share (and if so, how 
much of it) in the net estate in order to determine whether or not reasonable provision for the 
applicant has been made. Then, if it is of the opinion that it has not, it uses its discretion 
again to decide what order should be made. A narrow interpretation of the words would have 
potentially undermined a significant number of applications under the Act in cases where 
there was a high value property enjoyed by the survivor which was going to be sold at some 
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point in the future, but only a very small estate in liquid assets, because the first issue would 
have been decided against the applicant.4     
 About half of the reported cases on s. 9 have involved choses in action which are 
specifically included as being within the scope of the section by s. 9(4). The particular chose 
in action in these cases has been a jointly held life insurance policy where the courts have 
broadly resolved to hold that they are a jointly owned asset but the valuation of them for the 
purposes of the Act continues to cause difficulty. The other cases, which have involved real 
property, have similarly had problems concerning the value which can be considered as part 
of the net estate. In an early case, Jessop v Jessop,5 Nourse LJ held that it was appropriate 
to value the share of the deceased at 50% of the value of the property as at the date of 
death, which was £21,000, despite the fact that the value of a 50% share in the relevant 
property had quadrupled by the time of the hearing. The order which was subsequently 
made was that £10,000 of the deceased’s share should be considered as part of the net 
estate and paid to the plaintiff.        
As has been reported in this journal, 6 this approach was not followed in the majority 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Dingmar v Dingmar7, where by a majority the Court of 
Appeal (who did not refer to Jessop), held that value did not mean a frozen monetary value 
at the date of death but essentially meant a proportionate share. This has been made clearer 
by the amendment provided by s. 1(A). The result being that if it appears just to the court in 
the circumstances, where a property was previously held by two joint tenants, 50% of the 
current value of the property is considered to be part of the net estate, not only to consider 
whether or not reasonable provision has been made but also to inform the decision as to 
what order to make if it has not been.         
The most recent reported case involving consideration of s. 9 is Ames v Jones8, a decision 
of Mr Recorder Halpern in the Central London County Court. Here the 41 year old daughter 
of the deceased, applied under the Act for reasonable provision, three years after the death 
of her father. Her father’s Will had left his entire estate to his widow, who was not the mother 
of the applicant. The applicant had two teenage children and was living with her partner. An 
adult child can bring a claim under the Act, Ilott v. Mitson 9 provides guidance the court on 
such applications. But in practice it is likely that to succeed the applicant is going to have to 
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establish a moral claim. The judge took a highly sceptical view of the evidence of the 
applicant both in terms of her relationship with the father and her present financial 
circumstances and was unwilling to accept it unless independently corroborated.  
The judge considered the size of the estate for the purposes of sub-para. (e) of s.3. In his 
consideration of what assets could be included for the purposes of the application he had 
the only two significant assets before him. First, the former jointly owned matrimonial home 
and secondly, an investment property which produced a rental income. Where a jointly 
owned investment property has become vested in the surviving spouse, the question of 
whether or not to include the deceased’s share in the estate might well be balanced by the 
corresponding swelling of the spouse’s resources for the purposes of sub-para.(c) if it is not. 
But here the judge concluded that the investment property should be included since a half 
share of the equity amounted to £245,000. Further, 50% of the net rental income from the 
date of death until the hearing was also to be included, swelling the value to £252,000.  
One novel feature of the judgment is the consideration of whether the intention of the parties 
in holding the property as joint tenants is relevant to the question of whether to include the 
deceased’s share in the net estate. This was, of course, the contention of counsel for the 
defendant, with the implication that if the parties had intended the right of survivorship to 
operate then it was a stronger argument in favour of excluding it from the net estate for the 
purposes of sub-para. (e). The judge decided to include the investment property on the basis 
that it would be capricious to make the decision dependent on whether the parties had 
chosen to create a joint tenancy at the date of acquisition and there was no evidence that 
the parties had addressed their minds to this question and the beneficial joint tenancy had 
arisen by default. It is submitted that the position is even stronger than merely one of 
capriciousness. Given the internal logic of the Act it would be odd if an expressed desire to 
create a joint tenancy could avoid the courts’ exercise of discretion under s. 9 essentially 
allowing of a contracting out of the jointly owned assets. A deceased’s tenancy in common 
interest would automatically be transferred into the net estate and the whole point of s. 9 is 
to override the normal operation of the law of survivorship. Intentions, it is submitted are 
therefore irrelevant.  Curiously, no there was no discussion of whether there was a beneficial 
joint tenancy at all, since if it had arisen by default and not expressly, it could well have been 
subject to the equitable presumption of tenancy in common, where property is acquired for 
the purpose of a business.10 The deceased and the defendant had acquired this property 
partly to let and partly to run a business from selling balloons as equal partners.        
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Ultimately the claim failed because on an examination of the facts in the light of the s. 3 
criteria, the applicant was unable to demonstrate to the judge what her current and future 
needs and resources were, nor why she was not able to work to support herself. The claim 
also ran into the difficulty that on a consideration of sub-para. (c), that is the financial 
resources and financial needs which any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased has or is 
likely to have in the foreseeable future, because the widow needed the entire estate in order 
to support herself and was past working age. The judge was of the opinion that it would not 
be reasonable to expect the widow to sell or grant a further charge over the aforementioned  
former matrimonial home in which she lived which also provided her only capital and security 
into the future. The matrimonial home was worth £650,000, subject to a £200,000 mortgage 
requiring monthly payments of £1,900.    
Overall, an encouraging aspect of this case is the willingness of the judge to keep the 
property which has vested in the survivor and in which she is residing, out of the net estate 
for section 3(e) purposes. In Kourkgy v Lusher Wood J had held that, in the circumstances of 
that case, no reasonable person would require the defendant wife/survivor to sell the former 
matrimonial home in which she was living, and had lived for 23 years. It would probably be of 
considerable comfort for the survivor to have, for security and clarity, a general exclusion of 
this type of jointly owned property from s.9. The reason that there is no exclusion is, of 
course, because there could be a very valuable asset placed into the joint names of the 
deceased and the survivor, perhaps shortly before, and with the knowledge of, imminent 
death to avoid the 1975 Act. But it would, it is submitted, be possible to construct an 
exclusion based on the time at which the property was acquired. Insolvency legislation 
impugns certain transactions which occur shortly before bankruptcy or winding up.11 
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